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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a low-complexity, se-
crecy capacity achieving polar coding scheme for the cognitive
interference channel with confidential messages (CICC) under
the strong secrecy criterion. Existing polar coding schemes for
interference channels rely on the use of polar codes for the
multiple access channel, the code construction problem of which
can be complicated. We show that the whole secrecy capacity
region of the CICC can be achieved by simple point-to-point
polar codes due to the cognitivity, and our proposed scheme
requires the minimum rate of randomness at the encoder.
Index Terms—Polar codes, cognitive interference channel,
physical layer security, superposition coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio [1] has received increasing attention due
to its capability of exploiting the under-utilized spectrum
resource, as the scale of wireless networks has been grow-
ing drastically nowadays. The cognitive interference channel
(CIC) is a typical model for the study of cognitive radios. In
this model, a primary user (can be thought of as a licensed
user of a frequency band) and a cognitive user (can be thought
of as an unlicensed user wishing to share the same frequency
band) who has non-causal knowledge of the primary user’s
message transmit their own messages to their own destinations
at the same time. The communication problem in the CIC has
been studied in [2]–[7]. The security issue of the CIC was first
considered in [8], which gave the capacity-equivocation region
of the CIC with confidential messages (CICC) under the weak
secrecy criterion. A more general expression for the achievable
rate region of the CICC with additional randomness constraints
was derived in [9] under the strong secrecy criterion, which
coincides with the result of [8].
In this paper, we aim to design a polar coding scheme
to achieve the whole achievable rate region of [9]. Polar
codes [10], originally targeted for achieving the symmetric
capacity of point-to-point channels, have recently been shown
to work for multi-user channels as well. It is shown that polar
codes achieve the capacity regions or the known achievable
rate regions of multiple access channels (MAC) [11]–[14],
broadcast channels [15], [16], and interference channels (IC)
[17], [18]. In the area of physical layer security, polar codes
have been shown to achieve the secrecy capacity of wiretap
channels [19]–[24], and the secrecy capacity regions or the
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known secrecy rate regions of MAC wiretap channels [23],
[25], broadcast channels with confidential messages [22]–[24],
IC with confidential messages [23], two-way wiretap channels
[26], and bidirectional broadcast channels with common and
confidential messages [27]. A capacity achieving secrecy polar
coding scheme usually requires some eavesdropper channel
information at the transmitter, which can be a drawback in
practice. However, this is not a problem in the CICC since the
assumption that the cognitive transmitter knows the channel
information of both receivers is quite reasonable. Thus, the
CICC can be a scenario where secrecy polar coding can be
practically used.
The CICC differs from the IC with confidential messages
considered by [23] in that only the cognitive transmitter has
confidential messages, and the cognitive transmitter has non-
causal knowledge about the primary user’s messages. The
cognitivity not only enlarges the achievable rate region of an
IC, but also can help simplify the code design. As shown in
[17], [18], [23], existing polar code designs for ICs that can
achieve optimal rate regions require the use of the permutation
based MAC polarization [11], [14], as it is currently the only
method that can achieve the whole achievable rate region of a
MAC directly without time sharing or rate splitting. As far as
we know, the practicality of this method remains open since
the induced random variable by the permutation can be very
complicated. In this paper, we show that the whole achievable
rate region of the CICC can be achieved by point-to-point
polar codes in conjunction with properly designed chaining
schemes.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows.
• We propose a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the
general CICC that achieves the whole secrecy capacity
region under the strong secrecy criterion, without any
assumption on channel symmetry or degradation.
• We avoid using MAC polarization, which is a common
ingredient of polar code designs for ICs but may increase
system complexity, and develop a capacity achieving
scheme that only requires point-to-point polar codes.
• Secrecy coding schemes require a large amount of ran-
domness in order to protect the confidential message or
perform channel prefixing. We consider the randomness
required by the encoder as a limited resource and show
that our proposed scheme requires the minimum generat-
ing rate of randomness.
• We show that our proposed scheme is a general solu-
tion for several other multi-user polar coding problems,
including the CIC without secrecy requirement.
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2Fig. 1. The cognitive interference channel with confidential messages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the CICC model and the achievable rate region.
In Section III, we review some background knowledge on
polar codes. Details of our proposed scheme are presented
in Section IV. We analyze the performance of our proposed
scheme in Section V. In Section VI we discuss some exten-
sions of our proposed scheme.
Notations: In this paper, [N] denotes the index set of
{1, 2, ..., N}. For any A ⊂ [N], XA denotes the subvector
{X i : i ∈ A} of X1:N , {X1, X2, ..., XN }. The generator
matrix of polar codes is defined as GN = BNF⊗n [10], where
N = 2n with n being an arbitrary integer, BN is the bit-reversal
matrix, and F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
. Hq(X) stands for the entropy of X
with q-based logarithm.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Channel Model
Definition 1. A 2-user CIC consists of two input alphabets X1
and X2, two output alphabets Y1 and Y2, and a probability
transition function PY1Y2 |X1X2 (y1, y2 |x1, x2), where x1 ∈ X1 and
x2 ∈ X2 are channel inputs of transmitter 1 and 2, respectively,
and y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2 are channel outputs of receiver 1 and
2, respectively. The conditional joint probability distribution of
the 2-user CIC over N channel uses can be factored as
PY1:N1 Y1:N2 |X1:N1 X1:N2 (y
1:N
1 , y
1:N
2 |x1:N1 , x1:N2 )
=
N∏
j=1
PY1Y2 |X1X2 (y j1, y j2 |x j1, x j2). (1)
In this channel, transmitter i (i = 1, 2) sends message Mi to
receiver i. Receiver 1 is required to decode M1 only while
receiver 2 is required to decode both M1 and M21. Since
transmitter 2 has non-causal knowledge about transmitter 1’s
message, M1 can be jointly transmitted by the two transmitters.
If transmitter 2 wishes to keep part of its message (denoted
as M (s)2 ) secret from receiver 1, then this model is called the
CICC, as shown in Fig. 1.
Definition 2. A (2NR1, 2NR2, N) code for the 2-user CICC
consists of two message setsM1 = {1, 2, ..., [2NR1 ]} andM2 =
{1, 2, ..., [2NR2 ]}, two encoding functions
xN1 (m1) :M1 7→ XN1 and xN2 (m1,m2) :M1 ×M2 7→ XN2 ,
(2)
1This is a case where the capacity and capacity-equivocation regions of a
CIC is known [8]. In the general case, the capacity region of a CIC is still
unknown [7].
and two decoding functions
mˆ1(yN1 ) : YN1 7→ M1 and mˆ2(yN2 ) : YN2 7→ M1 ×M2. (3)
For a given (2NR1, 2NR2, N) code for the 2-user CICC,
reliability is measured by the average probability of error
Pe(N), defined as
Pe(N) = 12N (R1+R2)
∑
(M1,M2)∈M1×M2
Pr
{(
mˆ1(Y1:N1 ), mˆ2(Y1:N2 )
)
, (M1,M1,M2)|(M1,M2) sent
}
,
(4)
where (M1,M2) is assumed to be uniformly distributed over
M1×M2. Secrecy is measured the information leakage (strong
secrecy)
L(N) = I(Y1:N1 ; M (s)2 ), (5)
or the information leakage rate (weak secrecy)
LR(N) = 1N L(N). (6)
B. Achievable Rate Region
Let R2s be the transmission rate of confidential message
M (s)2 . A rate triple (R1, R2, R2s) is said to be achievable for the
2-user CICC if there exists a coding scheme such that
lim
N→∞ Pe(N) = 0; (7)
and
lim
N→∞ L(N) = 0 (strong secrecy), or (8)
lim
N→∞ LR(N) = 0 (weak secrecy). (9)
The capacity-equivocation region of the CICC (under the
constraint that the cognitive receiver must decode both trans-
mitters’ messages) was derived in [8] and is shown below.
Theorem 1 ( [8]). The capacity-equivocation region of the
CICC under the weak secrecy criterion is
R =
⋃
P∈P
©­«
R1
R2
R2s
ª®¬

0 ≤ R1 ≤ min{I(U; X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)}
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(U,V ;Y2 |X1)
R1 + R2 ≤ min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)}
+ I(V ;Y2 |U, X1)
0 ≤ R2s ≤ I(V ;Y2 |U, X1) − I(V ;Y1 |U, X1)

,
where P = {PUVX1X2 factorizing as: PU,V,X1PX1 |V }, and the
cardinality bounds for auxiliary random variables U and V
are
|U| ≤ |X1 | · |X2 | + 3,
|V| ≤ |X1 |2 · |X2 |2 + 4|X1 | · |X2 | + 3.
As we know, secrecy coding schemes require a large amount
of randomness in the encoder. Reference [9] considered the
generating rate of randomness needed by the stochastic en-
coder as a constraint and developed a more general achievable
rate region under the strong secrecy criterion as shown in
Theorem 2. In [9], besides the common message and the
3confidential message, transmitter 2’s message was further
divided into a private message, which should be decoded by
receiver 2 but not necessarily be secret from receiver 1.
Theorem 2 ( [9]). Let R∗ be closed convex set consisting
of rate quadruples (Rr, R1, R2p, R2s) for which there exist
auxiliary random variables (U,V) such that
(U, X1) ↔ V ↔ X2, (10)
(U,V) ↔ (X1, X2) ↔ (Y1,Y2), (11)
and
R1 ≤ min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)}, (12)
R2p + R2s ≤ I(U,V ;Y2 |X1), (13)
R1 + R2p + R2s ≤ I(V ;Y2 |U, X1)
+ min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)}, (14)
R2s ≤ I(V ;Y2 |U, X1) − I(V ;Y1 |U, X1), (15)
R2p + Rr ≥ I(X2;Y1 |U, X1), (16)
Rr ≥ I(X2;Y1 |U,V, X1). (17)
Then R∗ is an achievable rate region for the CICC. The
cardinality bounds for auxiliary random variables U and V
are the same as in Theorem 1.
III. POLAR CODING PRELIMINARIES
Polar codes were originally invented to achieve the symmet-
ric capacity of discrete memoryless channels (DMC) [10]. A
method for constructing polar codes for asymmetric channels
without alphabet extension was introduced in [28]. An im-
proved low-complexity method was independently developed
in [22] and [29], which overcomes the major drawback of the
scheme in [28] that the encoder and decoder need to share
a large amount of random mappings. Now we briefly review
this method.
First, we introduce the lossless polar source coding tech-
niques for arbitrary discrete memoryless sources in [30], [31].
Let (X,Y ) ∼ pX,Y be a random variable pair over (X × Y),
where X is the source to be compressed, Y is side information
of X , |X| = qX is a prime number2, and Y is an arbitrary
countable set. Let U1:N = X1:NGN be a transformation on N
successive samples of X . As N goes to infinity, polarization
happens in the sense that U j ( j ∈ [N]) becomes either almost
independent of (Y1:N,U1:j−1) and uniformly distributed, or
almost determined by (Y1:N,U1:j−1). For δN = 2−Nβ with
β ∈ (0, 1/2), we can define the following sets of polarized
indices:
H (N )
X |Y = { j ∈ [N] : HqX (U j |Y1:N,U1:j−1) ≥ 1 − δN }, (18)
L(N )
X |Y = { j ∈ [N] : HqX (U j |Y1:N,U1:j−1) ≤ δN }, (19)
which satisfy [22], [31]
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H (N )
X |Y | = HqX (X |Y ), (20)
lim
N→∞
1
N
|L(N )
X |Y | = 1 − HqX (X |Y ). (21)
2We only consider the prime number case because polarization in this case
is similar to the binary case. For composite qX , one needs to use some special
type of quasigroup operation instead of group operation to make polarization
happen [31].
The polarization of a single source X ∈ X can be seen as a
special case of the above case by letting Y = ∅. Similarly we
can define the following sets of polarized indices:
H (N )X = { j ∈ [N] : HqX (U j |U1:j−1) ≥ 1 − δN }, (22)
L(N )X = { j ∈ [N] : HqX (U j |U1:j−1) ≤ δN }, (23)
with
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H (N )X | = HqX (X), (24)
lim
N→∞
1
N
|L(N )X | = 1 − HqX (X). (25)
Next, we can consider polar coding for arbitrary discrete
memoryless channels with the aforementioned knowledge. Let
W(Y |X) be a DMC with a qX -ary input alphabet X, where qX
is a prime number, and an arbitrary countable output alphabet
Y. Let U1:N = X1:NGN and define H (N )X |Y , L
(N )
X |Y , H
(N )
X and
L(N )X , as in (18), (19), (22) and (23), respectively. Define
the information set (or reliable set), frozen set and almost
deterministic set respectively as follows:
I , H (N )X ∩ L(N )X |Y, (26)
F , H (N )X ∩ (L(N )X |Y )C, (27)
D , (H (N )X )C . (28)
D is called almost deterministic because part of its indices,
(H (N )X )C ∩ (L(N )X )C , are not fully polarized. The encoding
procedure goes as follows: {u j}j∈I carry information, {u j}j∈F
are filled with uniformly distributed frozen symbols (shared
between the transmitter and the receiver), and {u j}j∈D are
assigned by random mappings λj(u1:j−1) which randomly
generate an output u ∈ X with probability PU j |U1: j−1 (u|u1:j−1).
In order for the receiver to decode successfully, [22] and [29]
proposed to send part of the almost deterministic symbols,
{u j}
j∈(H(N )X )C∩(L(N )X |Y )C
, to the receiver with some reliable error-
correcting code separately, the rate of which is shown to vanish
as N goes to infinity.
Having received y1:N and recovered {u j}
j∈(H(N )X )C∩(L(N )X |Y )C
,
the receiver decodes u1:N with a successive cancellation de-
coder (SCD):
u¯ j ={
u j, if j ∈ (L(N )
X |Y )C,
arg maxu∈{0,1} PU j |Y1:NU1: j−1 (u|y1:N, u1:j−1), if j ∈ L(N )X |Y .
The transmission rate of this scheme, R = |I |/N , is shown
to achieve channel capacity [28]
lim
N→∞ R = I(X;Y ). (29)
IV. PROPOSED POLAR CODING SCHEME
Our encoding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2. Transmitter
1’s message M1 is split into two parts, M
(1)
1 and M
(2)
1 , carried
by transmitter 1’s and transmitter 2’s signals respectively.
Transmitter 2’s message M2 is split into three parts, a common
message M (c)2 intended for both receivers, a private message
4Fig. 2. Encoding scheme for the CICC.
M (p)2 intended only for receiver 2, and a confidential message
M (s)2 intended only for receiver 2 and must be secured from
receiver 1. Details of transmitter 2’s encoding procedure are as
follows. M (2)1 and M
(c)
2 are encoded into U
1:N first, M (p)2 and
M (s)2 are then superimposed on (U1:N, X1:N1 ) and encoded into
V1:N (known as superposition coding). Finally, randomness
MR is added to V1:N to generate transmitter 2’s final codeword
X1:N2 (known as channel prefixing). Note that X
1:N
1 can be
seen as the known interference to transmitter 2. Thus, this
superposition coding scheme also involves the idea of dirty
paper coding. In the rest of this section, the rates of M (1)1 ,
M (2)1 , M
(c)
2 , M
(p)
2 and M
(s)
2 will be denoted by R
(1)
1 , R
(2)
1 , R
(c)
2 ,
R(p)2 and R
(s)
2 , respectively. Notice that in Theorem 2, R2p is
the sum of R(c)2 and R
(p)
2 defined here.
A common problem of polar code designs for general multi-
user channels is that the polarized sets for different receivers
are usually not aligned (meaning that there is no inclusion
relation among them), making it difficult to achieve the optimal
rate region within a single transmission block. In this paper,
we adopt the chaining method [32] which connects a series
of encoding blocks to solve this problem. In our scheme, m
(m ≥ 1) encoding blocks are chained into a frame, and two
receivers decode a frame in reverse orders. Our scheme is
designed in such a way that receiver 1 (the primary receiver)
decodes in the natural order (i.e., from block 1 to block m)
while receiver 2 (the secondary receiver) decodes in the reverse
order (i.e., from block m to block 1).
In this paper, we only discuss the case when random
variables X1, X2, U and V all have prime alphabets. Suppose
qX1 = |X1 | and qX2 = |X2 | are two prime numbers, qU = |U|
is the smallest prime number larger than |X1 | · |X2 | + 3,
and qV = |V| is the smallest prime number larger than
|X1 |2 · |X2 |2 + 4|X1 | · |X2 | + 3. Consider a random variable
tuple (U,V, X1, X2,Y1,Y2) with joint distribution PUVX1X2Y1Y2
that satisfy (10) and (11). The goal of our proposed scheme
is to achieve every equation in (12)–(17).
A. Common Message Encoding
Common messages M (1)1 , M
(2)
1 and M
(c)
2 are encoded into
two sequences of random variables, X1:N1 and U
1:N . At
first glance, we may synthesize two MACs, P(Y1 |X1,U) and
P(Y2 |X1,U), and design a polar code that works for both of
them. This approach requires the use of MAC polarization or
rate splitting techniques which will increase the complexity of
the scheme. Note that there is no major difference between
M (2)1 and M
(c)
2 in regard to our encoding scheme. They only
affects the rate allocation between M1 and M2. Due to this
flexibility, we will show that the whole region can be achieved
with simple point-to-point polar codes. For simplicity, define
R(c) = R(2)1 + R
(c)
2 . From (12) we have
R(1)1 + R
(c) ≤ min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)}. (30)
Our approach consists of two layers of coding. In the first
layer, M (1)1 is encoded into X
1:N
1 , treating random variable
U as noise. In the second layer, M (2)1 and M
(c)
2 are en-
coded into U1:N with X1:N1 being treated as side informa-
tion. The receivers decode X1:N1 first, and then utilize the
estimation of X1:N1 to decode U
1:N . In a conventional MAC
case, such an approach can only achieve a corner point of
the achievable rate region of a MAC. However, under the
cognitive setting, since transmitter 2 knows transmitter 1’s
message non-causally, and the message carried by U1:N can
be allocated flexibly between two transmitters, this approach
can achieve more points. We first show how to achieve
R(1)1 + R
(c) = min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)} in this subsection
and R(p)2 +R
(s)
2 = I(U,V ;Y2 |X1) in the next subsection, and then
prove in Section V-C that other rate pairs in the achievable rate
region in Theorem 2 can be achieved by adjusting the ratio
between M (2)1 and M
(c)
2 .
Let U1:N1 = X
1:N
1 GN and U
′1:N = U1:NGN . For δN = 2−N
β
with β ∈ (0, 1/2), define the following polarized sets:
H (N )X1 ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqX1 (U
j
1 |U1:j−11 ) ≥ 1 − δN
}
,
L(N )
X1 |Y1 ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqX1 (U
j
1 |Y1:N1 ,U1:j−11 ) ≤ δN
}
,
L(N )
X1 |Y2 ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqX1 (U
j
1 |Y1:N2 ,U1:j−11 ) ≤ δN
}
,
H (N )
U |X1 ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqU (U
′ j |X1:N1 ,U
′1:j−1) ≥ 1 − δN
}
,
L(N )
U |Y1X1 ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqU (U
′ j |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U
′1:j−1) ≤ δN
}
,
L(N )
U |Y2X1 ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqU (U
′ j |Y1:N2 , X1:N1 ,U
′1:j−1) ≤ δN
}
.
(31)
Then define the following sets of indices for U1:N1 :
I(1)1c = H (N )X1 ∩ L
(N )
X1 |Y1,
I(2)1c = H (N )X1 ∩ L
(N )
X1 |Y2,
F1c = H (N )X1 ∩
(L(N )
X1 |Y1
)C ∩ (L(N )
X1 |Y2
)C
,
D1c =
(H (N )X1 )C,
(32)
where I(1)1c and I(2)1c are the reliable sets for receiver 1 and 2
respectively, F1c is the intersection of two receivers’ frozen
sets, and D1c is the almost deterministic set. Similarly define
I(1)2c = H (N )U |X1 ∩ L
(N )
U |Y1X1,
I(2)2c = H (N )U |X1 ∩ L
(N )
U |Y2X1,
F2c = H (N )U |X1 ∩
(L(N )
U |Y1X1
)C ∩ (L(N )
U |Y2X1
)C
,
D2c =
(H (N )
U |X1
)C
.
(33)
5for U
′1:N . From (29) we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I(1)1c | = I(X1;Y1), limN→∞
1
N
|I(1)2c | = I(U;Y1 |X1),
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I(2)1c | = I(X1;Y2), limN→∞
1
N
|I(2)2c | = I(U;Y2 |X1).
(34)
If we design two separate chaining schemes for U1:N and
U
′1:N respectively, it is easy to verify that the achievable
common message rate is
R(1)1 + R
(c) ≤ min{I(X1;Y1), I(X1;Y2)}
+ min{I(U;Y1 |X1), I(U;Y2 |X2)}. (35)
Such a scheme achieves (30) only in the following two cases:
• (Case 1) I(X1;Y1) ≤ I(X1;Y2) and I(U;Y1 |X1) ≤
I(U;Y2 |X1),
• (Case 2) I(X1;Y1) ≥ I(X1;Y2) and I(U;Y1 |X1) ≥
I(U;Y2 |X1).
In the other two cases of
• (Case 3) I(X1;Y1) < I(X1;Y2) and I(U;Y1 |X1) >
I(U;Y2 |X1),
• (Case 4) I(X1;Y1) > I(X1;Y2) and I(U;Y1 |X1) <
I(U;Y2 |X1),
the achievable rate in (35) is strictly smaller than that in (30).
In these cases, the chaining scheme should be jointly designed
for U1:N and U
′1:N , which we refer to as cross-transmitter
chaining.
1) Case 1 and Case 2: Since Case 2 is similar to Case 1 by
swapping the roles of two transmitters, we only describe the
chaining scheme in Case 1 for brevity. From (34) we know
that given sufficiently large N , we always have |I(1)1c | ≤ |I(2)1c |
and |I(1)2c | ≤ |I(2)2c |. Define
I(0)1c = I(1)1c ∩ I(2)1c , I(1a)1c = I(1)1c \ I(2)1c ,
I(0)2c = I(1)2c ∩ I(2)2c , I(1a)2c = I(1)2c \ I(2)2c .
(36)
Choose an arbitrary subset I(2a)1c of I(2)1c \ I(1)1c such that
|I(2a)1c | = |I(1a)1c |, and an arbitrary subset I(2a)2c of I(2)2c \ I(1)2c
such that |I(2a)2c | = |I(1a)2c |. The chaining scheme goes as
follows.
(I) In the 1st block, transmitter 1 encodes its common
message as:
• {u j1}j∈I(0)1c ∪I(1a)1c store message symbols from M
(1)
1 ,
• {u j1}j∈(I(0)1c ∪I(1a)1c ∪D1c )C carry frozen symbols uniformly
distributed over X1,
• {u j1}j∈D1c are assigned by random mappings λj(u1:j−11 )
that generate an output u ∈ X1 according to conditional
probability P
U
j
1 |U
1: j−1
1
(u|u1:j−11 ),
and transmitter 2 encodes its common message as:
• {u′ j}
j∈I(0)2c ∪I
(1a)
2c
store message symbols from M (2)1 and
M (c)2 ,
• {u′ j}
j∈(I(0)2c ∪I
(1a)
2c ∪D2c )C
carry frozen symbols uniformly
distributed over U,
• {u′ j}j∈D2c are assigned by random mappings λj(u
′1:j−1)
that generate an output u ∈ U according to conditional
probability PU′ j |U′1: j−1 (u|u
′1:j−1).
Fig. 3. The chaining scheme of transmitter k (k = 1, 2) for common messages
in Case 1.
(II) In the ith (1 < i < m) block, transmitter 1 assigns
{u j1}j∈I(2a)1c with the same value of {u
j
1}j∈I(1a)1c in block i − 1,
and transmitter 2 assigns {u′ j}
j∈I(2a)2c
with the same value of
{u′ j}
j∈I(1a)2c
in block i − 1. The rest of u1:N1 and u
′1:N are
determined in the same way as in (I).
(III) In the mth block, transmitter 1 assigns {u j1}j∈I(1a)1c
with frozen symbols uniformly distributed over X1, and trans-
mitter 2 assigns {u′ j}
j∈I(1a)2c
with frozen symbols uniformly
distributed over U. The rest of u1:N1 and u
′1:N are determined
in the same way as in (II).
The chaining scheme in Case 1 is shown in Fig. 3. Af-
ter each transmission block, transmitter 1 additionally sends
a vanishing fraction of the almost deterministic symbols,
{u j1}j∈(H(N )X1 )C∩(L(N )X1 |Y1 )C
and {u j1}j∈(H(N )X1 )C∩(L(N )X1 |Y2 )C
, to re-
ceiver 1 and 2 respectively with some reliable error-correcting
code. Similarly, transmitter 2 sends {u′ j}
j∈(H(N )
U |X1 )
C∩(L(N )
U |Y1X1 )
C
and {u′ j}
j∈(H(N )
U |X1 )
C∩(L(N )
U |Y2X1 )
C to two receivers respectively
after each block. From Section III we know that the rate for
transmitting these symbols vanishes as N increases. Thus, the
cost for these extra transmissions can be made negligible. Also
note that frozen symbols at Fkc∪
(I(2)
kc
\(I(1)
kc
∪I(2a)
kc
)) (k = 1, 2)
can be reused since they only need to be independently and
uniformly distributed. Thus, the rate of frozen symbols which
must be shared between transmitters and receivers can be made
negligible as well by reusing them over sufficient number of
blocks. In the analysis part in the next section we will assume
that this part of frozen symbols are the same for all blocks in
a frame.
2) Case 3 and Case 4: Since Case 4 is similar to Case 3
by swapping the roles of two transmitters, we only describe
the chaining scheme in Case 3 for brevity. In this case, given
sufficiently large N , we always have |I(1)1c | ≤ |I(2)1c | and
|I(1)2c | ≥ |I(2)2c |.
If min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)} = I(U, X1;Y1), which we
refer to as Case 3-1, we have |I(2)1c | − |I(1)1c | ≥ |I(1)2c | − |I(2)2c |
given sufficiently large N . In this case, define I(0)1c , I(0)2c , I(1a)1c
and I(1a)2c in the same way as in (36), and define
I(2a)2c = I(2)2c \ I(1)2c . (37)
6Fig. 4. The chaining scheme for common messages in Case 3-1.
Choose an arbitrary subset I(1b)2c of I(1a)2c with |I(1b)2c | = |I(1)2c |−
|I(2)2c |, and an arbitrary subset I(2a)1c of I(2)1c \I(1)1c with |I(2a)1c | =
|I(1a)1c | + |I(1b)2c |. Let I(2b)1c be a subset of I(2a)1c with the same
size as I(1b)2c . The chaining scheme in Case 3-1 goes as follows
and is illustrated in Fig. 4.
(I) In the 1st block, the encoding procedure is similar to
Case 1, except that {u′ j}
j∈I(1b)2c
of transmitter 2 are filled with
message symbols from M (1)1 only, as they will be chained with
transmitter 1’s next encoding block.
(II) In the ith (1 < i < m) block, transmitter 1 assigns
{u j1}j∈I(2a)1c \I(2b)1c with the same value of {u
j
1}j∈I(1a)1c in block
i − 1, and {u j1}j∈I(2b)1c with the same value of {u
′ j}
j∈I(1b)2c
in
block i − 1, while transmitter 2 assigns {u′ j}
j∈I(2a)2c
with the
same value of {u′ j}
j∈I(1a)2c \I
(1b)
2c
in block i−1. The rest of u1:N1
and u
′1:N are determined in the same way as in (I).
(III) In the mth block, transmitter 1 assigns {u j1}j∈I(1a)1c
with frozen symbols uniformly distributed over X1, and trans-
mitter 2 assigns {u′ j}
j∈I(1a)2c
with frozen symbols uniformly
distributed over U. The rest of u1:N1 and u
′1:N are determined
in the same way as in (II).
Note that the cross-transmitter chaining scheme described
above does not violate the assumption that transmitter 1 is
not cognitive, as the common message used for the cross-
transmitter chaining only comes from M1, of which both
transmitters have non-causal knowledge.
Otherwise if min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)} = I(U, X1;Y2),
which we refer to as Case 3-2, we have |I(2)1c | − |I(1)1c | ≤
|I(1)2c | − |I(2)2c | given sufficiently large N . The chaining scheme
in this case is similar to that in Fig. 4 with the two transmitters
exchanging their roles.
Similar to Case 1, two transmitters send part of their almost
Fig. 5. The chaining scheme for transmitter 2’s private and confidential
messages.
deterministic symbols to two receivers with some reliable
error-correcting code after each block. Also, transmitter 1’s
frozen symbols at F1c ∪
(I(2)1c \ (I(1)1c ∪ I(2a)1c )) and transmitter
2’s frozen symbols at F2c can be reused over different blocks.
B. Private and Confidential Message Encoding
Since private message M (p)2 and confidential message M
(s)
2
are superimposed on (U1:N, X1:N1 ) by auxiliary random vari-
able V1:N , we treat (U1:N, X1:N1 ) as side information when
applying polarization on V1:N . Let V
′1:N = V1:NGN . For
δN = 2−N
β
with 0 < β < 1/2, define
H (N )
V |X1U ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqV (V
′ j |X1:N1 ,U1:N,V
′1:j−1) ≥ 1 − δN
}
,
H (N )
V |Y1X1U ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqV (V
′ j |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V
′1:j−1)
≥ 1 − δN
}
,
L(N )
V |Y2X1U ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqV (V
′ j |Y1:N2 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V
′1:j−1) ≤ δN
}
.
(38)
Partition the indices of V
′1:N as follows:
I2s = H (N )V |X1U ∩ L
(N )
V |Y2X1U ∩H
(N )
V |Y1X1U,
I2p = H (N )V |X1U ∩ L
(N )
V |Y2X1U ∩
(H (N )
V |Y1X1U
)C
,
F2 = H (N )V |X1U ∩
(L(N )
V |Y2X1U
)C ∩H (N )
V |Y1X1U,
R2 = H (N )V |X1U ∩
(L(N )
V |Y2X1U
)C ∩ (H (N )
V |Y1X1U
)C
,
D2 =
(H (N )
V |X1U
)C
,
(39)
where I2s is the reliable and secure set, I2p is the reliable but
insecure set, R2 is the unreliable and insecure set, F2 is the
frozen set, and D2c is the almost deterministic set.
The aim of using the chaining method is to deal with the
unreliable and insecure set R2. Consider the positive secrecy
rate case (i.e., the right-hand-side of (15) is positive). In
this case, |I2s | > |R2 | always holds for sufficiently large N .
Choose a subset I(2)2s of I2s such that |I(2)2s | = |R2 |. Denote
I(1)2s = I2s \ I(2)2s . The chaining scheme for transmitter 2’s
private and confidential messages is also designed in such a
way that receiver 2 decodes from block m to block 1, same
as its decoding order for common messages. Details of the
scheme are as follows and shown in Fig. 5.
(I) In the 1st block,
7• {v′ j}
j∈I(1)2s
carry confidential message symbols,
• {v′ j}
j∈I2p∪I(2)2s ∪R2
carry private message symbols,
• {v′ j}j∈F2 are filled with uniformly distributed frozen
symbols,
• {v′ j}j∈D2 are assigned by random mappings λj(v
′1:j−1)
that generate an output v ∈ V according to conditional
probability PV ′ j |X1:N1 U1:NV
′1: j−1 ,
(II) In the ith (1 < i < m) block, {v′ j}
i∈I(2)2s
are assigned
with the same value as {v′ j}i∈R2 in the (i − 1)th block, and the
rest of v
′1:N are determined in the same way as in (I).
(III) In the mth block, {v′ j}j∈R2 carry some uniformly
distributed random symbols that are shared only between
transmitter 2 and receiver 2 (known as secret seed), and the
rest of v
′1:N are determined in the same way as in (II).
The secret seed rate can be made arbitrarily small by
increasing the number of chained blocks in a frame. Af-
ter each transmission block, transmitter 2 additionally sends
a vanishing fraction of the almost deterministic symbols,
{v′ j}
j∈(H(N )
V |X1U )
C∩(L(N )
V |Y2X1U )
C , to receiver 2 secretly with some
reliable error-correcting code. Note that unlike in the common
message encoding, the additional transmission for the almost
deterministic symbols here must be kept secret from receiver
1. Nevertheless, the rate of this transmission can be made
arbitrarily small by increasing N . Similar to the common
message encoding, frozen symbols at F2 can also be reused
over different blocks. In the next section we will show that
with the reuse of frozen symbols, our proposed scheme still
achieves strong secrecy.
C. Channel Prefixing
To generate the final codeword X1:N2 for transmitter 2, one
can transmit (X1:N1 ,U1:N,V1:N ) through a virtual channel with
transition probability PX2 |X1UV . Also, one can consider X2 and
(X1,U,V) as correlated sources and apply polar source coding
to obtain the final codeword. To design a scheme that requires
the minimum generating rate of randomness, we take the latter
approach in this paper. Let U1:N2 = X
1:N
2 GN . For δN = 2−N
β
with 0 < β < 1/2, define
H (N )
X2 |X1UV ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqX2 (U
j
2 |X1:N1 ,U1:N,V1:N,U1:j−12 )
≥ 1 − δN
}
,
H (N )
X2 |Y1X1UV ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqX2 (U
j
2 |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V1:N,
U1:j−12 ) ≥ 1 − δN
}
,
L(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV ,
{
j ∈ [N] : HqX2 (U
j
2 |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V1:N,
U1:j−12 ) ≤ δN
}
.
(40)
Once (X1:N1 ,U1:N,V1:N ) is determined, X1:N2 can be obtained
as follows. Let wr be a random sequence uniformly distributed
over X2 and of length |H (N )X2 |Y1X1UV |,
• {u j2}j∈H(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV
= wr ,
• {u j2}j∈H(N )
X2 |X1UV \H
(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV
are filled with random sym-
bols uniformly distributed over X2,
• {u j2}j∈(H(N )
X2 |X1UV )
C are assigned by random mappings
λj(u1:j−12 ) that generate an output x ∈ X2 according to
conditional probability P
U
j
2 |X1:N1 U1:NV 1:NU
1: j−1
2
,
• Compute x1:N2 = u
1:N
2 GN .
An intuitive explanation for why random symbols in
H (N )
X2 |Y1X1UV can be reused but not those in H
(N )
X2 |X1UV \
H (N )
X2 |Y1X1UV is that {u
j
2}j∈H(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV
are very unreliable for
receiver 1, thus reusing them does not harm security. We will
show in the next section that with such a channel prefixing
approach, our proposed scheme can achieve strong secrecy.
D. Decoding
1) Common Message Decoding: We first consider receiver
1, who decodes from block 1 to block m. Although we
have considered different cases in Section IV-A, the decoding
procedure can be summarized in a unified form as follows:
(I) In the 1st block, receiver 1 first decodes {u j1}j∈I(0)1c ∪I(1a)1c
with a SCD and obtains an estimate of u¯1:N1 . Then it decodes
{u′ j}
j∈I(0)2c ∪I
(1a)
2c
with a SCD, in which u¯1:N1 is treated as side
information, and obtains an estimate of u¯
′1:N .
(II) In the ith (1 < i < m) block, {u¯ j1}j∈I(2a)1c and {u¯
′ j}
j∈I(2a)2c
are deduced from u¯1:N1 and u¯
′1:N in block i − 1 according to
different cases (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4), and the rest are decoded
in the same way as in (I).
(III) In the mth block, {u¯ j1}j∈I(1a)1c and {u¯
j
1}j∈I(1a)2c are
decoded as frozen symbols, and the rest are decoded in the
same way as in (II).
Receiver 2 decodes the common messages similarly, except
that it decodes from block m to block 1.
2) Private and Confidential Messages Decoding: Receiver
2 decodes the private and confidential messages from block m
to block 1 as follows.
(I) In the mth block, receiver 1 first decodes {v′ j}j∈I2p∪I2s
with uˆ1:N1 and uˆ
′1:N in the same block being treated as side
information, where uˆ1:N1 and uˆ
′1:N are its decoding result of
common messages, and obtains an estimate of vˆ
′1:N .
(II) In the ith (1 ≤ i < m) block, {v′ j}i∈R2 are deduced
from {vˆ′ j}
i∈I(2)2s
in block i + 1, and the rest are decoded in the
same way as in (I).
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Error Performance
Let U˜1:N , V˜1:N , X˜1:N1 , X˜
1:N
2 , Y˜
1:N
1 and Y˜
1:N
2 be the vectors
generated by our encoding scheme. The following lemma
shows that the joint distribution induced by our encoding
scheme is asymptotically indistinguishable from the target
joint distribution (the one that our scheme is designed for).
Lemma 1.
‖PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 X1:N2 Y1:N1 Y1:N2 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 X˜1:N2 Y˜1:N1 Y˜1:N2 ‖
≤ O(√N2−Nβ/2). (41)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
8Denote receiver 1’s error probability when decoding mes-
sage M (1)1 in block i by P
(1)
e1,i , and that when decoding
(M (2)1 ,M (c)2 ) by P(2)e1,i . For i = [2,m], define the following error
events
EX1Y1,i , {(X1:N1 Y1:N1 ) , (X˜1:N1 Y˜1:N1 )i},
EchX1,i−1 , {(U¯
chaining
1 )i−1 , (U˜chaining1 )i−1},
EchU,i−1 , {(U¯
′chaining)i−1 , (U˜′chaining)i−1},
EX1,i , {(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i},
Ei , EX1Y1,i ∪ EchX1,i−1 ∪ EchU,i−1,
E ′i , EX1Y1,i ∪ EchX1,i−1 ∪ EchU,i−1 ∪ EX1,i,
where (·)i denotes vectors in block i, U¯ denotes the decoding
result of U, and ”chaining” in the superscript stands for
the elements used for chaining. Using optimal coupling [33,
Lemma 3.6] we have
P[EX1Y1,i] =‖ PX1:N1 Y1:N1 − PX˜1:N1 Y˜1:N1 ‖ .
Then we have
P(1)
e1,i ≤ P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i]
= P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i |Ei]P[Ei]
+ P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i |ECi ]P[ECi ]
≤ P[Ei] + P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i |ECi ]
≤ P(EX1Y1,i) + P(EchX1,i−1) + P(EchU,i−1)
+ P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i |ECi ]
≤
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (2 + 2
√
3) + NδN
+ P[(X¯1:N1 )i−1 , (X˜1:N1 )i−1]
+ P[(U¯1:N )i−1 , (U˜1:N )i−1], (42)
where (42) holds from (68) and the error probability of source
polar coding [30].
Similarly we have
P(2)
e1,i ≤ P[(U¯1:N )i , (U˜1:N )i]
≤ P(EX1Y1,i) + P(EchX1,i−1) + P(EchU,i−1) + P(EX1,i)
+ P[(U¯1:N )i , (U˜1:N )i |E′Ci ]
≤ δcN + NδN + P[(X¯1:N1 )i−1 , (X˜1:N1 )i−1]
+ P[(U¯1:N )i−1 , (U˜1:N )i−1] + P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i],
(43)
where δcN ,
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (2 + 2
√
3). From (42) and (43) we
have
P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i] + P[(U¯1:N )i , (U˜1:N )i]
≤ 3
(
δcN + NδN + P[(X¯1:N1 )i−1 , (X˜1:N1 )i−1]
+ P[(U¯1:N )i−1 , (U˜1:N )i−1]
)
,
By induction we have
P[(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i] + P[(U¯1:N )i , (U˜1:N )i]
≤
i−1∑
k=1
3k(δcN + NδN ) + 3i−1P[(X¯1:N1 )1 , (X˜1:N1 )1]
+ 3i−1P[(U¯1:N )1 , (U˜1:N )1]. (44)
From the above analysis and the assumption that receivers
have perfect knowledge of frozen symbols we have
P[(X¯1:N1 )1 , (X˜1:N1 )1] + P[(U¯1:N )1 , (U˜1:N )1] ≤ 3(δcN + NδN ).
Thus, the overall error probability of receiver 1 in a frame can
be upper bounded by
Pe1 ≤
m∑
k=1
(
P(1)
e1,k + P
(2)
e1,k
)
≤
m∑
i′=1
i′∑
k=1
3k(δcN + NδN )
= O(3mN2−Nβ ). (45)
For receiver 2, the error probability of decoding common
messages in a frame can be similarly upper bounded by
P(c)
e2 ≤ O(3mN2−N
β ). (46)
To estimate receiver 2’s error probability in decoding its
private and confidential messages block i, P(p,s)
e2,i , we define
the following error events:
EUVX1Y2,i , {(U1:NX1:N1 V1:NY1:N2 ) , (U˜1:N X˜1:N1 V˜1:NY˜1:N2 )i},
EU,i , {(U¯1:N )i , (U˜1:N )i},
EX1,i , {(X¯1:N1 )i , (X˜1:N1 )i},
EV,i+1 , {(V¯1:N )i+1 , (V˜1:N )i+1},
Ei , EUVX1Y2,i ∪ EU,i ∪ EX1,i ∪ EV,i+1.
Using optimal coupling [33, Lemma 3.6] we have
P[EUVX1Y2,i] =‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 Y1:N1 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 Y˜1:N1 ‖ .
Similar to the analysis for common message decoding,
P(p,s)
e2,i can be upper bounded by
P(p,s)
e2,i ≤ P[EV,i]
≤ δcN + NδN + P[EU,i] + P[EX1,i] + P[EV,i+1]
≤
m∑
k=i
(3m−k + 1)(δcN + NδN ) + P[EV,i+1],
where δcN ,
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (2 + 2
√
3). By induction and (44)
we have
P(p,s)
e2,i ≤
m∑
i′=i
m∑
k=i′
(3m−k + 1)(δcN + NδN )). (47)
Then
P(p,s)
e2 ≤
m∑
k=1
P(p,s)
e2,k = O(3mN2−N
β ). (48)
B. Secrecy
We first introduce some notations used in this subsection.
In the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ m) block, the outputs of Enc 1, 2a and
2b (see Fig. 2) are denoted by X1,i , Ui and Vi , respectively.
Transmitter 2’s confidential message at I(1)2s is denoted by
Mi , and private message at I(2)2s (which is used for chaining)
by Ei . Receiver 1’s channel output is denoted by Y1,i . The
9additionally transmitted almost deterministic symbols in U1:N1
and U
′1:N are denoted by D1c,i and D2c,i , respectively. The
reused frozen symbols in U1:N1 , U
′1:N and V
′1:N are denoted by
F1c , F2c and F2p , respectively. The non-reused frozen symbols
(see Fig. 3 and 4) in U1:N1 in the 1st and mth blocks are denoted
by F11 and F1m respectively, and those in U
′1:N by F21 and
F2m respectively. The reused randomness at H (N )X2 |Y1X1UV in the
channel prefixing scheme is denoted by W . For brevity, denote
F , {F1c, F2c, F11, F1m, F21, F2m, F2p}, Di , {D1c,i,D2c,i},
M i:m , {Mi, ...,Mm}, etc.
Lemma 2. For any i ∈ [m], we have
I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F) ≤ O(N32−Nβ ). (49)
Proof. See Appendix B.

Lemma 3. For any i ∈ [1,m − 1],
I(W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i:m, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m) ≤ O(N32−N
β ). (50)
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Lemma 4. For any i ∈ [1,m − 1], let
Li = I(M i:m, Ei,W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F). (51)
Then we have
Li − Li+1 ≤ O(N32−Nβ ). (52)
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Suppose receiver 1 has perfect knowledge of the frozen
symbols in each block. Then the information leakage is
L(N) = I(M1:m;Y1:m1 ,D1:m, F)
≤ I(M1:m, Em,W ;Y1:m1 ,D1:m, F).
From the proof of Lemma 4 and the fact that receiver 1 has no
knowledge about the secret seed we have Lm ≤ O(N32−Nβ ).
Thus, by induction hypothesis we have
L(N) ≤
m−1∑
i=1
(
Li − Li+1
)
+ Lm ≤ O(mN32−Nβ ). (53)
C. Achievable Rate Region
1) Randomness Rate: Since wr is reused in a frame,
the generating rate of randomness required by our channel
prefixing scheme is
Rr =
1
mN
( |H (N )
X2 |Y1X1UV | + m|H
(N )
X2 |X1UV \ H
(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV |
)
. (54)
From [34, Lemma 1] we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H (N )
X2 |Y1X1UV )
C \ L(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV | = 0. (55)
Then we have
lim
N→∞,m→∞ Rr = limN→∞
1
N
|H (N )
X2 |X1UV ∩ (H
(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV )
C |
= lim
N→∞
1
N
|H (N )
X2 |X1UV ∩ L
(N )
X2 |Y1X1UV |
= I(X2;Y1 |U,V, X1). (56)
As has been noted in [9], the difference between transmitter 2’s
private message and the randomness required by the encoder
is just whether it carries information. We can see that (56) is
the minimum generating rate of randomness required. Thus,
(17) is achievable with our proposed scheme.
2) Private and Confidential Message Rates: From Fig. 5
we can see that the private and confidential message rates in
our proposed scheme are
R(p)2 =
1
N
( |I2p | + |R2 |), R(s)2 = 1N |I(1)2s |, (57)
respectively. By a similar analysis to the general wiretap polar
code [24], we have
lim
N→∞ R
(p)
2 = I(V ;Y1 |U, X1), (58)
lim
N→∞ R
(s)
2 = I(V ;Y2 |U, X1) − I(V ;Y1 |U, X1). (59)
Thus, (15) can be achieved.
In the private and confidential message encoding procedure
introduced in Section IV-B, positions in V
′1:N allocated for
private messages can also be assigned with randomness. And
note that we can allocate more randomness in the encoder
without sacrificing reliability or secrecy (e.g., we can replace
some of the confidential message symbols with random sym-
bols), but we can never allocate less of them. Thus, from (56)
and (58) we can see that (16) can be achieved.
3) Common Message Rate: In Case 1, the common mes-
sage rates of two transmitters in our proposed scheme are
R(1)1 =
m|I(0)1c | + (m − 1)|I(1a)1c |
mN
=
|I(1)1c |
N
− |I
(1a)
1c |
mN
,
R(c) =
m|I(0)2c | + (m − 1)|I(1a)2c |
mN
=
|I(1)2c |
N
− |I
(1a)
2c |
mN
,
(60)
respectively. From (34) we have
lim
N→∞,m→∞ R
(1)
1 = I(X1;Y1), limN→∞,m→∞ R
(c) = I(U;Y1 |X1).
(61)
Since min{I(U, X1;Y1), I(U, X1;Y2)} = I(U, X1;Y1) in this case,
if we allocate all of R(c) to transmitter 1’s message, then
(12) is achieved. No matter how we allocate two transmitters’
common messages, the sum rate of all messages always
achieves (14).
To prove the achievability of (13) in Case 1 requires some
change in the coding scheme. If we wish to maximize the
sum rate of private and confidential messages, transmitter 2
will not help transmit M1 at all. Therefore, whether receiver 1
can decode U does not matter. Then transmitter 2 can use all of
I(2)2c to transmit its own message at any rate below I(U;Y2 |X1)
(now this message becomes private message). Then from (58)
and (59) we can see that (13) is achieved.
Another thing worth noting is that, in the above case, in
order for both receivers to decode transmitter 1’s message,
R1 ≤ min{I(X1;Y1), I(X1;Y2)} must hold. Then the sum rate
of all messages satisfies
R1 + R2p + R2s ≤ min{I(X1;Y1), I(X1;Y2)} + I(U,V ;Y2 |X1),
which may seem to violate (14). However, since U in fact
carries private message in this case, it is equivalent to remove
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auxiliary random variable U and simply design a code on V .
We can also see this problem from the mutual information
aspect. Due to the Markov chains of (10) and (11), we have
I(U,V ;Y2 |X1) = I(V ;Y2 |X1) + I(U;Y2 |V, X1)
= I(V ;Y2 |X1).
With auxiliary random variable U being removed, we can
readily see that (14) still holds.
In Case 3-1, R(1)1 and R
(c) are the same as in Case 1,
thus (12) and (14) are achievable. As we have explained in
Section IV-A2, {u′ j}
j∈I(1b)2c
must be assigned to transmitter
1’s common message. Thus, in this case,
R(c)2 ≤ I(U;Y1 |X1) −
(
I(U;Y1 |X1) − I(U;Y2 |X1)
)
= I(U;Y2 |X1).
(62)
Then from (58), (59) and (62) we can see that (13) is achieved
(R2p in Theorem 2 is the sum of R
(c)
2 and R
(p)
2 here).
Since Case 2 (resp. 4) is similar to Case 1 (resp. 3), and
Case 3-2 is similar to Case 3-1, we can now conclude that
our proposed scheme achieves the whole region in Theorem 2
under the strong secrecy criterion with randomness constraint.
VI. DISCUSSION
Although our proposed polar coding scheme is designed
under secrecy constraints, it can be readily modified for the
case without secrecy and achieve the capacity region of the
CIC given by [8, Theorem 4], since the capacity region is
just a special case of the capacity-equivocation region when
secrecy constraints are removed.
We note some relations between our work and [22], which
considers polar coding for the broadcast channel with confi-
dential messages. From Theorem 2 and [22, Theorem 1] we
can see that the rate region in [22, Theorem 1] is a special
case of that in Theorem 2 when transmitter 1 is removed. Also,
as shown in [8], the region defined in Theorem 1 reduces to
the capacity region of the MAC with degraded message sets
if we set Y1 = Y2. Thus, our proposed scheme can be seen
as a general solution for the aforementioned multi-user polar
coding problems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Similar to the proof of [22, Lemma 5], we have
D(PX1:N1 | |PX˜1:N1 ) ≤ NδN,
D(PU1:NX1:N1 | |PU˜1:N X˜1:N1 ) ≤ 2NδN,
D(PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 | |PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 ) ≤ 3NδN,
D(PX1:N2 V 1:N | |PX˜1:N2 V˜ 1:N ) ≤ 4NδN .
Then we have
‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 X1:N2 Y1:N1 Y1:N2 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 X˜1:N2 Y˜1:N1 Y˜1:N2 ‖
=‖ PX1:N2 |V 1:N PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 − PX˜1:N2 |V˜ 1:N PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 ‖
(63)
≤‖ PX1:N2 |V 1:N PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 − PX˜1:N2 |V˜ 1:N PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 ‖
+ ‖ PX˜1:N2 |V˜ 1:N PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 − PX˜1:N2 |V˜ 1:N PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 ‖
(64)
=‖ PX1:N2 |V 1:N PV 1:N − PX˜1:N2 |V˜ 1:N PV 1:N ‖
+ ‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 ‖ (65)
≤‖ PX1:N2 V 1:N − PX˜1:N2 V˜ 1:N ‖
+ ‖ PX˜1:N2 V˜ 1:N − PX˜1:N2 |V˜ 1:N PV 1:N ‖
+ ‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 ‖ (66)
≤‖ PX1:N2 V 1:N − PX˜1:N2 V˜ 1:N ‖ + ‖ PV 1:N − PV˜ 1:N ‖
+ ‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 ‖ (67)
≤
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (2 + 2
√
3) (68)
= O(√N2−Nβ/2),
where (63), (65) and (67) hold by [35, Lemma 17], and (64)
and (66) hold by the triangle inequality.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let t = |I2s | + |I2p | and w = |F2 |. Denote {a1, a2, ..., at } =
I2s with a1 < ... < at , {b1, b2, ..., bw} = F2 with b1 < ... < bw ,
and {c1, c2, ..., ct+w} = {a1, ..., at, b1, ..., bw} with c1 < ... <
ct+w . Let Fc be short for {F1c, F2c, F11, F1m, F21, F2m}. Then
we have
I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F)
= HqV (Mi, Ei) − HqV (Mi, Ei |Y1,i,Di, F)
= HqV (Mi, Ei) − HqV (Mi, Ei, F2p |Y1,i,Di, Fc)
+ HqV (F2p |Y1,i,Di, Fc)
≤ t + w − HqV (Mi, Ei, F2p |Y1,i,X1,i,Ui) (69)
= t + w −
t+w∑
j=1
HqV (V˜
′c j |Y˜1:N1 , X˜1:N1 , U˜1:N, V˜
′ {c1,...,c j−1 })
≤
t+w∑
j=1
(
1 − HqV (V˜
′c j |Y˜1:N1 , X˜1:N1 , U˜1:N, V˜
′1:c j−1 )), (70)
where (69) holds because
HqV (Mi, Ei) ≤ t, HqV (F2p |Y1,i,Di, Fc) ≤ w,
and
HqV (Mi, Ei, F2p |Y1,i,Di, Fc) ≥ HqV (Mi, Ei, F2p |Y1,i,X1,i,Ui),
(71)
which is shown in more details as follows. For i = 1,
HqV (Mi, Ei, F2p |Y1,i,Di, Fc)
= HqV (Mi, Ei, F2p |Y1,i,Di, F1c, F2c, F11, F21)
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because (F1m, F2m) is independent from the rest items in the
left-hand-side of (71). Thus, (71) holds. For i = m and 1 <
i < m, we can similarly show that (71) always holds.
Note that the entropies above are calculated under the
induced distribution by the encoding scheme. Under the target
distribution PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 Y1:N1 , from (39) we have
HqV (V
′c j |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V
′1:c j−1 ) ≥ 1 − δN . (72)
From [36, Theorem 17.3.3] we have
|HqV (V˜
′c j |Y˜1:N1 , X˜1:N1 , U˜1:N, V˜
′1:c j−1 )
− HqV (V
′c j |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V
′1:c j−1 )|
≤‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 Y1:N1 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 Y˜1:N1 ‖
× log |U|
N |V|N |X1 |N |Y1 |N
‖ PU1:NV 1:NX1:N1 Y1:N1 − PU˜1:N V˜ 1:N X˜1:N1 Y˜1:N1 ‖
= O(N22−Nβ ) +O(Nβ+12−Nβ ). (73)
From (70) and (72) we have
HqV (V
′c j |Y1:N1 , X1:N1 ,U1:N,V
′1:c j−1 ) ≥ 1 −O(N22−Nβ ).
Thus,
I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F) ≤ O(N32−Nβ ). (74)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To prove Lemma 3, we first prove the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 5. For any i ∈ [1,m],
I(Ei;W |Yi:m1 ,Di:m,M i:m) ≤ O(N32−N
β ).
Proof. Since Ei is independent from (Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m),
we have
I(Ei;W |Yi:m1 ,Di:m,M i:m)
= I(Ei;W |Y1,i,Di,Mi)
= HqX2 (W |Y1,i,Di,Mi) − HqX2 (W |Y1,i,Di,Mi, Ei)
≤ HqX2 (W) − HqX2 (W |Y1,i,X1,i,Ui,Vi).
Then we can prove this lemma similar to the proof of Lemma
??.

Lemma 6. For any i ∈ [1,m − 1],
I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |W)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
− I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
+ I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
≤ O(N32−Nβ ).
Proof.
I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |W)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
≤ I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei, Ei+1;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |W)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
= I(Y1,i,Di,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |W, F, Ei+1)
+ I(F, Ei+1;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |W)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
= I(F, Ei+1;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m,W)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m) (75)
= I(F, Ei+1;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
+ I(F, Ei+1;W |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ; F |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
= I(F;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |Ei+1)
− I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |Ei+1)
+ I(F, Ei+1;W |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ; F |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
= I(F;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m, Ei+1)
− I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m, Ei+1)
+ I(F, Ei+1;W |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ; F |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m) (76)
= I(F;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
+ I(F; Ei+1 |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m, Ei+1)
+ I(F, Ei+1;W |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ; F |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
= I(F;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m, Ei+1)
+ I(Ei+1;W |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m),
where (75) holds because block i and the next m − i blocks
are independent conditioned on (W, F, Ei+1) and W is indepen-
dent from (F, Ei+1), and (76) holds due to the independence
between Ei+1 and (F,W). Since
I(F;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
≤ I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
and
I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m, Ei+1)
≥ I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m),
by Lemma 5 we can readily prove this lemma. 
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Now we will prove Lemma 3. Since W , Mi and Ei are
independent from one another, we have
I(W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i:m, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m)
= I(W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F,M i:m, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
= I(W ;Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei)
+ I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
= I(W ;Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei) + I(W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
+ I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m |W)
− I(Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m,M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F,M i+1:m)
≤ I(W ;Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei) +O(N32−Nβ ), (77)
where (77) holds due to Lemma 6. Similarly to the proof of
Lemma ??, we can show that
I(W ;Y1,i,Di, F,Mi, Ei) ≤ I(W ;Y1,i,X1,i,Ui,Vi)
≤ O(N32−Nβ ).
Then we can see that Lemma 3 holds.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
I(M i:m, Ei,W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F)
− I(M i+1:m, Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F)
= I(Mi, Ei,W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i+1:m)
+ I(M i+1:m;Y1,i,Di |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F)
+ I(M i+1:m;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F)
− I(M i+1:m, Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F)
= I(Mi, Ei,W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i+1:m)
+ I(M i+1:m;Y1,i,Di |Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m)
= I(Mi, Ei,W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i+1:m)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m) (78)
= I(Mi, Ei;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i+1:m)
+ I(W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i:m, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m)
= I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F |M i+1:m)
+ I(Mi, Ei;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m |M i+1:m,Y1,i,Di, F)
+ I(W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i:m, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m)
= I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F) + I(W ;Yi:m1 ,Di:m, F |M i:m, Ei)
− I(Ei+1,W ;Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m, F |M i+1:m), (79)
where (78) holds due to the independence between M i+1:m and
(Y1,i,Di), and (79) holds because (Mi, Ei) and (Yi+1:m1 ,Di+1:m)
are independent, and M i+1:m is independent from both
(Mi, Ei) and (Y1,i,Di, F), thus I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F |M i+1:m) =
I(Mi, Ei;Y1,i,Di, F). Then by Lemma ?? and 3 we have
Li − Li+1 ≤ O(N32−Nβ ). (80)
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